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Beginning with IR-04-024, all monitoring reports follow the same template. This is so that 
anybody interested in this monitoring exercise can immediately recognize the year-to-
year changes in the country assessments. Note that whether or not these changes 
become visible depends on the assessment itself: We work with relative uncertainty 
intervals, which prove to be fairly robust as they compensate ‘small’ changes in the 
country assessments. The Excel databases, one behind each monitoring report, can be 
requested free of charge. 
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Abstract 
This study follows up IIASA Interim Report IR-04-024 (Jonas et al., 2004a), which 
addresses the preparatory detection of uncertain greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
changes (also termed emission signals) under the Kyoto Protocol. The question probed 
was how well do we need to know net emissions if we want to detect a specified 
emission signal after a given time? The authors used the Protocol’s Annex I countries as 
net emitters and referred to all Kyoto GHGs (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6) 
excluding CO2 emissions/removals due to land-use change and forestry (LUCF). They 
motivated the application of preparatory signal detection in the context of the Kyoto 
Protocol as a necessary measure that should have been taken prior to/in negotiating the 
Protocol. The authors argued that uncertainties are already monitored and are 
increasingly made available but that monitored emissions and uncertainties are still 
dealt with in isolation. A connection between emission and (total) uncertainty estimates 
for the purpose of an advanced country evaluation has not yet been established. The 
authors developed four preparatory signal detection techniques and applied these to the 
Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol. The frame of reference for preparatory 
signal detection is that Annex I countries comply with their committed emission targets 
in 2008–2012. The emissions path between the base year and commitment year/period 
is generally assumed to be a straight line, and the path of historical emissions is not 
taken into consideration. 
This study applies the strictest of these techniques, the combined undershooting and 
verification time (Und&VT) concept to advance the monitoring of the GHG emissions 
reported by the old and new Member States of the European Union (EU). In contrast to 
the earlier study, the Member States’ committed emission targets under the EU burden 
sharing in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol are taken into account, however, still 
assuming that only domestic measures will be used (i.e., excluding Kyoto mechanisms). 
The Und&VT concept is applied in a standard mode, i.e., with reference to the Member 
States’ committed emission targets in 2008–2012, and in a new mode, i.e., with 
reference to linear path emission targets between base year and commitment year. Here, 
the intermediate year of reference is 2003. 
To advance the reporting of the EU, uncertainty and its consequences are taken into 
consideration, i.e., (i) the risk that a Member State’s true emissions in the commitment 
year/period are above its true emission limitation or reduction commitment; and (ii) the 
detectability of its target. Undershooting the committed EU target or EU-compatible, 
but detectable, target can decrease this risk. The Member States’ linear path 
undershooting targets for the year 2003 are contrasted with their actual emission 
situation in that year, for which the distance-to-target indicator (DTI) is employed that 
has been introduced by the European Environment Agency. 
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In 2003 eleven EU-25 Member States exhibit a negative DTI and thus appear as 
potential sellers: Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Poland, Sweden, Slovakia and the UK. However, expecting that all of the EU 
Member States will eventually exhibit relative uncertainties in the range of 5–10% and 
above rather than below excluding LUCF and Kyoto mechanisms, the Member States 
require considerable undershooting of their EU-compatible, but detectable, targets if one 
wants to keep the said risk low ( 0.1α≈ ) that the Member States’ true emissions in the 
commitment year/period are above their true EU reference lines. As of 2003, these 
conditions can only be met by seven new and two old Member States (ranked in terms 
of credibility): Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, 
Germany and the United Kingdom, while two old Member States, France and Sweden, 
can only act as potential high-risk sellers ( 0.5≈α ). The other EU-25 Member States do 
not meet their linear path (base year–commitment year) undershooting targets in 2003, 
or do not have Kyoto targets at all (Cyprus and Malta). 
The relative uncertainty, with which countries report their emissions, matters. For 
instance, with relative uncertainty increasing from 5 to 10%, the linear path 2008/12 
emission signal of the old EU-15 as a whole (which has jointly approved, as a Party, an 
8% emission reduction under the Kyoto Protocol) switches from detectable to non-
detectable ( 0.5>α ), indicating that the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol were 
imprudent because they did not take uncertainty and its consequences into account. 
It is anticipated that the evaluation of emission signals in terms of risk and detectability 
will become standard practice and that these two qualifiers will be accounted for in 
pricing GHG emission permits. 
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Preparatory Signal Detection for the 
EU-25 Member States Under EU Burden 
Sharing―Advanced Monitoring  
Including Uncertainty (1990–2003) 
Andriy Bun and Matthias Jonas 
1 Background and Objective 
This study follows up IIASA Interim Report IR-04-024 (Jonas et al., 2004a). It applies 
the strictest of the preparatory signal detection techniques developed in this report,1 the 
combined undershooting and verification time (Und&VT) concept,2 to advance the 
monitoring of the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reported by the old and new 
Member States of the European Union (EU) under EU burden sharing in compliance 
with the Kyoto Protocol. Here, ‘emissions’ refer to all Kyoto GHGs (CO2, CH4, N2O, 
HFCs, PFCs, and SF6) excluding CO2 emissions/removals due to land-use change and 
forestry (LUCF). The Member States’ emissions are evaluated in relation to the EU’s 
linear target as of 2003 and in terms of their positive and negative contributions to this 
target.3 This monitoring process is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1. The 
figures and the table provide details, for each Member State and the EU-25 as a whole, 
of trends in emissions of GHGs up to 2003. The EU-15 as a whole is shown separately, 
as it were the old EU Member States which have jointly approved, as a Party, the Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (EU Official Journal, 
2002: Annex II). Figure 1 follows the total emissions of the EU over time since 1990, 
while the distance-to-target indicator (DTI) introduced in Figure 2, based on the country 
data listed in Table 1, is a measure of the derivation of actual GHG emissions in 2003 
from the linear target path between 1990 and the respective Member State target for 
2008–2012, assuming that only domestic measures will be used (i.e., excluding Kyoto 
mechanisms). A negative DTI means that a Member State is below its linear target path, 
a positive DTI that a Member State is above its linear target path (EEA, 2005b: Figure 
4.2 in combination with Table 10; cf. also EEA, 2005a: Tables ES.6 and 2.6).4 As 
Figures 1 and 2 only present relative information of the kind ‘must buy versus can sell’, 
Figure 3 is added, which translates this information into absolute numbers based on the 
Member States’ emission changes as of 2003 and their linear targets for that year (Table 
1). Figure 3 helps us to understand the 2003 situation of the EU in quantitative terms. 
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Figure 1: EU-25 GHG emissions for 1990–2003 (excluding LUCF and Kyoto 
mechanisms) with 1990 emissions as reference emissions. The 
corresponding EU-15 GHG emissions and linear target path 1990–2008/12, 
with base-year emissions as reference emissions, are shown for comparison. 
Source: EEA (2005a: Figures ES.1 and ES.2, and 2.1 and 2.2, respectively) 
reproduced; original data from Ritter (2006). 
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Figure 2: Distance-to-target indicator (DTI) for EU-25 Member States in 2003 in 
consideration of the EU burden sharing targets under the Kyoto Protocol 
(excluding LUCF and Kyoto mechanisms). The EU-15 DTI (referring to the 
EU-15 linear target path 1990–2008/12) is shown for comparison. 
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Table 1: Base year and 2003 GHG emissions (in CO2-equivalents; excluding LUCF 
and Kyoto mechanisms), 2002–2003 emission changes and 2008–2012 
targets (in %) for EU-25 Member States under the Kyoto Protocol and EU 
burden sharing.5 For comparison, aggregated values for old (EU-15) and new 
EU member States (EU-10) are shown separately. Source: EEA (2005b: 
Table 10). 
 
The overall objective of the study is to advance the reporting of the EU by taking 
uncertainty and its consequences into consideration, i.e., (i) the risk that a Member 
State’s true emissions in the commitment year/period are above its true emission 
limitation or reduction commitment (what is called the true EU reference line); and (ii) 
the detectability of its target. Undershooting the committed EU target or EU-
compatible, but detectable, target can decrease the risk that the Member State’s true 
emissions in the commitment year are above its true EU reference line. Here, the 
intermediate year of reference in the focus of attention is 2003, i.e., the linear target path 
1990–2008/12 is evaluated with respect to this year. 
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Figure 3: Figure 2 presented in absolute terms. Potential buyers in 2003: AT, BE, DK, 
ES, FI, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, SI; potential sellers in 2003: CZ, DE, EE, 
FR, HU, LT, LV, PL, SE, SK, UK. Member States not considered: CY, MT. 
See ISO Country Code for country abbreviations and text for underlying 
assumptions. The EU-15 is shown separately in lower right corner. 
Uncertainties are extracted from the national inventory reports of the Member States 
and are monitored separately. However, a connection between emission and (total) 
uncertainty estimates for the purpose of an advanced country evaluation has not yet 
been established. A recent compilation of uncertainties has been presented by EEA 
(2005a: Table 1.9; cf. Table 2 below, which was taken from the revised final version of 
this report available at http://www.foeeurope.org/climate/EUemissionsReport2005.doc). 
This compilation makes available quantified uncertainty estimates from fourteen of the 
EU-25 Member States (extracted from their National Inventory Reports 2004 and 2005). 
From the remaining Member States, either a national inventory report was available, 
which did not include a quantitative uncertainty analysis, or no national inventory report 
was available at all. The uncertainties refer to a 95% confidence interval6 and neglect, 
with the exception of France, the Netherlands and United Kingdom, emissions/removals 
due to land-use change and forestry (LUCF). 
Taking uncertainty into account in combination with undershooting is important 
because the amount, by which a Member State undershoots its EU target or its EU-
compatible, but detectable, target, can be traded. Towards installing a successful trading 
regime, Member States may want to price the risk associated with this amount. We 
anticipate that the evaluation of emission signals in terms of risk and detectability will 
become standard practice. 
Section 2 recalls the methodology of the Und&VT concept, which is applied in Section 
3 with the above objective in mind. Results and conclusions are presented in Section 4. 
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Table 2: Uncertainty estimates available from EU-25 Member States excluding LUCF (with the exception of France, the Netherlands and 
United Kingdom) and Kyoto mechanisms.7 Source: http://www.foeeurope.org/climate/EUemissionsReport2005.doc. 
 6
Table 2: continued. 
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2 Methodology 
The applied Und&VT concept is described in detail in Jonas et al. (2004a). With the 
help of KPδ , the normalized emission change under the EU burden sharing in 
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol,8 and 
critδ , the critical (crit) emission limitation or 
reduction target, the four cases listed in Table 3 and shown in Figure 4 are 
distinguished. The Member States’ 
critδ  values can be determined knowing the relative 
(total) uncertainty (ρ) of their net emissions (see equation (32a,b) in Jonas et al., 2004a): 
( )
( )
2 1 KP
crit
2 1 KP
x x 0
1
for
x x 0
1
ρ δρ
δ
ρ δρ
⎧⎪⎪ < >⎪⎪ +⎪⎪⎪=⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪− ≥ ≤⎪⎪ −⎪⎩
 , (1a,b) 
where ρ is assumed to be symmetrical and, in line with preparatory signal detection, 
constant over time, i.e., ( ) ( )1 2t tρ ρ=  with t1 referring to the base year 19909 and t2 to 
the commitment year 2010 (as the temporal mean of the commitment period 2008–
2012). The Member States’ best estimates of their emissions at it are denoted by ix . 
Table 4 assembles the nomenclature that is required for recalling Cases 1–4. 
Table 3: The four cases that are distinguished in applying the Und&VT concept (see 
also Figure 4). 
Case 1 
crit KPδ δ≤  Detectable EU/Kyoto target Emission Reduction: 
KP 0δ >  
Case 2 crit KPδ δ>  
Non-detectable EU/Kyoto target: 
An initial or obligatory undershooting is applied so that 
the Member States’ emission signals become 
detectable (before the Member States are permitted to 
make economic use of excess emission reductions) 
Case 3 crit KPδ δ<  Non-detectable EU/Kyoto target 
Emission Limitation: 
KP 0δ ≤  
Case 4 crit KPδ δ≥  Detectable EU/Kyoto targeta 
As in Case 2, an initial or 
obligatory undershooting is 
applied unconditionally for all 
Member States (their emission 
reductions, not increases, must 
become detectable) 
a
 Detectability according to Case 4 differs from detectability according to Case 1. The reason for this is 
that countries committed to emission reduction ( KP 0δ > ) and emission limitation ( KP 0δ ≤ ) exhibit an 
over/undershooting dissimilarity (see Jonas et al., 2004a: Sections 3.1 and 3.2 for details). 
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Figure 4: The four cases that are distinguished in applying the Und&VT concept (see 
also Table 3). Emission reduction: KP 0δ > ; emission limitation: KP 0δ ≤ . 
Case 1: δKP > 0: δcrit ≤ δKP. Here, use is made of equations (43a), (B1), (D1), (B3) and 
(D2) of Jonas et al. (2004a: Appendix D): 
( )
( )
2
KP mod
1
x 11 1
x 1 1 2
δ δα ρ≤ − = −+ −  , (2), (3) 
where 
 ( )
( )mod KP KP
11 1 U
1 1 2
δ δ δα ρ= − − = ++ −  (4), (5) 
 ( )
( )
( )KP
1 2
U 1
1 1 2
α ρδ α ρ
−
= −
+ −  . (6) 
Case 2: δKP > 0: δcrit > δKP. Here, use is made of equations (45a), (B1), (D3a,b), (D4) 
and (42b) of Jonas et al. (2004a: Appendix D): 
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( )
( )
2
crit mod
1
x 11 1
x 1 1 2
δ δα ρ≤ − = −+ −  , (7), (3) 
where 
 ( )
( )mod crit KP
11 1 U
1 1 2
δ δ δα ρ= − − = ++ −  (8), (5) 
 ( )
( )
( )Gap crit
1 2
U U 1
1 1 2
α ρδ α ρ
−
= + −
+ −  (9) 
 with 
 Gap crit KPU δ δ= −  . (10) 
Table 4: Nomenclature for Cases 1–4. 
Known or Prescribed: 
ix  
A Member State’s net emissions (best estimate) at ti 
α  The risk that a Member State’s true emissions in the commitment year/period are above its true 
emission limitation or reduction commitment (true EU reference line) 
Note: In Jonas et al. (2004a: Section 3.4 and Appendix D) α  is replaced by 
v
α  (where ‘v’ 
refers to ‘verifiable’) in Cases 2–4, which is not done here 
KPδ  A Member State’s normalized emission change committed under the EU burden sharing in 
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol 
ρ  The relative (total) uncertainty of a Member State’s net emissions 
Derived: 
U  Undershooting 
Note: In Jonas et al. (2004a: Section 3.4 and Appendix D) U  is replaced by vU  (where ‘v’ 
refers to ‘verifiable’) in Cases 2–4, which is not done here 
GapU  Initial or obligatory undershooting 
critδ  A Member State’s critical emission limitation or reduction target or, equivalently, its reference 
line for undershooting (Case 2: 
critδ ; Case 3: critδ− ; Case 4:  crit KP crit2δ δ δ′− = − ) 
modδ  A Member State’s modified emission limitation or reduction target 
Unknown: 
t,ix  
A Member State’s true emissions at ti 
Although true emissions are unknown, the risk α  can be grasped that t,2x  is ≥ the true EU 
reference line (which is given, e.g., by ( )KP t,11 xδ− in Case 1) 
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Case 3: δKP ≤ 0: δcrit < δKP. Here, use is made of equations (50a), (B1), (D7a,b), (D8) 
and (52) of Jonas et al. (2004a: Appendix D): 
( )
( )
2
crit mod
1
x 11 1
x 1 1 2
δ δα ρ≤ + = −+ −  , (11), (3) 
where 
 ( )
( )mod crit KP
11 1 U
1 1 2
δ δ δα ρ= − + = ++ −  (12), (5) 
 ( )
( )
( )Gap crit
1 2
U U 1
1 1 2
α ρδ α ρ
−
= + +
+ −  (13) 
 with 
 ( )Gap crit KPU δ δ=− +  . (14) 
Case 4: δKP ≤ 0: δcrit ≥ δKP. Here, use is made of equations (55a), (B1), (D11a,b), (D12), 
(57) and (58) of Jonas et al. (2004a: Appendix D): 
( )
( )
2
crit mod
1
x 11 1
x 1 1 2
δ δα ρ′≤ + = −+ −  , (15), (3) 
where 
 ( )
( )mod crit KP
11 1 U
1 1 2
δ δ δα ρ′= − + = ++ −  (16), (5) 
 ( )
( )
( )Gap crit
1 2
U U 1
1 1 2
α ρδ α ρ
−′= + +
+ −  (17) 
 with 
 Gap critU 2δ=−   (18) 
 
crit KP crit2δ δ δ′− = −  . (19) 
It is recalled that emission reductions are measured positively ( KP 0δ > ) and emission 
increases negatively ( KP 0δ < ), which is opposite to the emissions reporting for the EU 
(see Section 1). However, this can be readily rectified by introducing a minus sign when 
reporting the results. 
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3 Results 
The evaluation procedure encompasses two steps. In the first step the Und&VT concept 
is applied with reference to the time period base year–commitment year. With the 
knowledge of ρ , the relative (total) uncertainty with which a Member State reports its 
net emissions and which is assumed here to take on one of the values listed in Table 5 
(excluding LUCF and Kyoto mechanisms),  Equation (1) can be used to determine 
critδ , 
the Member State’s critical emission limitation or reduction target. 
Comparing 
critδ  and KPδ , the Member States’ 2008–12 targets under the EU burden 
sharing in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol (see Table 1), allows to identify which 
case applies to which Member State, that is, the conditions that underlie the emissions 
reporting of a particular Member State and the EU-15 as a whole (see Tables 3 and 6). 
Table 7 lists the Member States’ modified emission limitation or reduction targets modδ  
(equations (4), (8), (12) and (16)), where the (Case 1: ‘ t ,2x -greater-than-( )KP t,11 xδ− ’; 
Cases 2 and 3: ‘ t ,2x -greater-than-( )crit t ,11 xδ− ’; Case 4: ‘ t ,2x -greater-than-
( )( )KP crit t ,11 2 xδ δ− − ’) risk α  is specified to be 0, 0.1, …, 0.5. Table 8 lists the 
undershooting U (Equations (6), (9), (13) and (17)) contained in the modified emission 
limitation or reduction targets 
modδ  listed in Table 7. 
As explained by Jonas et al. (2004a: Section 3.3), it is the sum of KPδ  and U, i.e., the 
modified emission limitation or reduction target modδ  (see Equation (5)) that matters 
initially because it describes a Member State’s overall burden. However, once Member 
States have agreed upon their KPδ  targets, it is the undershooting U which then becomes 
solely important. Therefore, only U is considered in the 2nd step of the evaluation, where 
the focus is on the Member States’ emissions as of 2003. 
The results are interpreted in Section 4, together with the conclusions that can be drawn 
from this interpretation. 
Table 5: Critical emission limitation or reduction targets ( critδ ) for a range of relative 
uncertainty values (ρ ) (according to equation (1), covering the uncertainty 
estimates available from the EU-25 Member States (confer Table 2). 
 KP 0δ >  KP 0δ ≤   KP 0δ >  KP 0δ ≤  
ρ  
% 
critδ  
% 
critδ  
% 
ρ  
% 
critδ  
% 
critδ  
% 
0.0  0.00 15.0 13.04 -17.65 
2.5 2.44 -2.56 20.0 16.67 -25.00 
5.0 4.76 -5.26 30.0 23.08 -42.86 
7.5 6.98 -8.11 40.0 28.57 -66.67 
10.0 9.09 -11.11    
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In this second step, the U values reported in Table 8 are multiplied with the factor 
( 2013− ). The minus sign ensures compliance with the emissions reporting for the EU, 
which measures emission reductions negatively and emission increases positively (see 
Section 1). The factor ( 2013 ) establishes the linear path (base year–commitment year) 
undershooting targets for the year 2003 (see Table 9). 
Table 6: The conditions (in the form of Cases 1–4) that underlie the emissions 
reporting of a particular EU-25 Member State (MS) and the EU-15 as a 
whole (which has approved, as a Party, the Kyoto Protocol to the United 
Nations Framework on Climate Change). Green: Detectable EU/Kyoto target 
under emission reduction (Case 1). Orange: Detectable EU/Kyoto target 
under emission limitation (Case 4). Red: Non-detectable EU/Kyoto Target 
under emission reduction (Case 2) or emission limitation (Case 3). Blue: 
Member States having no Kyoto target. 
Case Identification for ρ=  
MS KPδ  % 0% 2.5% 5% 7.5% 10% 15% 20% 30% 40% 
AT 13.0 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 
BE 7.5 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 
CY -          
CZ 8.0 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 
DK 21.0 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 Case 2 
EE 8.0 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 
FI 0.0 Case 4 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 
FR 0.0 Case 4 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 
DE 21.0 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 Case 2 
GR -25.0 Case 4 Case 4 Case 4 Case 4 Case 4 Case 4 Case 4 Case 3 Case 3 
HU 6% Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 
IE -13.0 Case 4 Case 4 Case 4 Case 4 Case 4 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 
IT 6.5 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 
LV 8.0 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 
LT 8.0 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 
LU 28.0 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 
MT -          
NL 6.0 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 
PL 6.0 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 
PT -27.0 Case 4 Case 4 Case 4 Case 4 Case 4 Case 4 Case 4 Case 3 Case 3 
SK 8.0 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 
SI 8.0 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 
ES -15.0 Case 4 Case 4 Case 4 Case 4 Case 4 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 
SE -4.0 Case 4 Case 4 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 
UK 12.5 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 
EU-15 8.0 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 
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Table 7: The Und&VT concept applied to the EU-25 Member States (MS) and the 
EU-15 as a whole. The table lists the 2008–2012 modified emission 
limitation or reduction targets 
modδ  (equations (4), (8), (12) and (16)), where 
the (Case 1: ‘ t ,2x -greater-than-( )KP t,11 xδ− ’; Cases 2 and 3: ‘ t ,2x -greater-
than-( )crit t ,11 xδ− ’; Case 4: ‘ t ,2x -greater-than- ( )( )KP crit t ,11 2 xδ δ− − ’) risk α  
is specified to be 0, 0.1, …, 0.5. 
Modified Emission Limitation or Reduction Target 
modδ  in % for ρ=  MS KPδ  
% 
α  
1 0% 2.5% 5% 7.5% 10% 15% 20% 30% 40% 
AT 13.0 0.0 13.0 15.1 17.1 19.1 20.9 24.4 30.6 40.8 49.0 
  0.1 13.0 14.7 16.3 17.9 19.4 22.4 28.2 38.0 45.9 
  0.2 13.0 14.3 15.5 16.7 17.9 20.2 25.6 34.8 42.4 
  0.3 13.0 13.9 14.7 15.5 16.3 18.0 22.8 31.3 38.4 
  0.4 13.0 13.4 13.9 14.3 14.7 15.6 19.9 27.4 33.9 
  0.5 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 16.7 23.1 28.6 
BE 7.5 0.0 7.5 9.8 11.9 14.0 17.4 24.4 30.6 40.8 49.0 
  0.1 7.5 9.3 11.1 12.7 15.8 22.4 28.2 38.0 45.9 
  0.2 7.5 8.9 10.2 11.5 14.2 20.2 25.6 34.8 42.4 
  0.3 7.5 8.4 9.3 10.2 12.6 18.0 22.8 31.3 38.4 
  0.4 7.5 8.0 8.4 8.9 10.9 15.6 19.9 27.4 33.9 
  0.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 9.1 13.0 16.7 23.1 28.6 
CZ 8.0 0.0 8.0 10.2 12.4 14.4 17.4 24.4 30.6 40.8 49.0 
  0.1 8.0 9.8 11.5 13.2 15.8 22.4 28.2 38.0 45.9 
  0.2 8.0 9.4 10.7 12.0 14.2 20.2 25.6 34.8 42.4 
  0.3 8.0 8.9 9.8 10.7 12.6 18.0 22.8 31.3 38.4 
  0.4 8.0 8.5 8.9 9.4 10.9 15.6 19.9 27.4 33.9 
  0.5 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.1 13.0 16.7 23.1 28.6 
DK 21.0 0.0 21.0 22.9 24.8 26.5 28.2 31.3 34.2 40.8 49.0 
  0.1 21.0 22.5 24.0 25.5 26.9 29.5 31.9 38.0 45.9 
  0.2 21.0 22.2 23.3 24.4 25.5 27.5 29.5 34.8 42.4 
  0.3 21.0 21.8 22.5 23.3 24.0 25.5 26.9 31.3 38.4 
  0.4 21.0 21.4 21.8 22.2 22.5 23.3 24.0 27.4 33.9 
  0.5 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 23.1 28.6 
EE 7.5 0.0 7.5 9.7 11.9 13.9 16.9 23.9 30.1 40.3 48.5 
  0.1 7.5 9.3 11.0 12.7 15.3 21.9 27.7 37.5 45.4 
  0.2 7.5 8.9 10.2 11.5 13.7 19.7 25.1 34.3 41.9 
  0.3 7.5 8.4 9.3 10.2 12.1 17.5 22.3 30.8 37.9 
  0.4 7.5 8.0 8.4 8.9 10.4 15.1 19.4 26.9 33.4 
  0.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 8.6 12.5 16.2 22.6 28.1 
FI 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 9.8 14.5 19.2 28.4 37.5 56.0 76.2 
  0.1 0.0 4.5 8.9 13.3 17.7 26.5 35.3 53.9 74.7 
  0.2 0.0 4.0 8.0 12.1 16.1 24.4 33.0 51.6 73.1 
  0.3 0.0 3.5 7.1 10.8 14.5 22.3 30.6 49.0 71.3 
  0.4 0.0 3.0 6.2 9.5 12.9 20.0 27.9 46.1 69.1 
  0.5 0.0 2.6 5.3 8.1 11.1 17.6 25.0 42.9 66.7 
FR 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 9.8 14.5 19.2 28.4 37.5 56.0 76.2 
  0.1 0.0 4.5 8.9 13.3 17.7 26.5 35.3 53.9 74.7 
  0.2 0.0 4.0 8.0 12.1 16.1 24.4 33.0 51.6 73.1 
  0.3 0.0 3.5 7.1 10.8 14.5 22.3 30.6 49.0 71.3 
  0.4 0.0 3.0 6.2 9.5 12.9 20.0 27.9 46.1 69.1 
  0.5 0.0 2.6 5.3 8.1 11.1 17.6 25.0 42.9 66.7 
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Table 7: continued. 
DE 21.0 0.0 21.0 22.9 24.8 26.5 28.2 31.3 34.2 40.8 49.0 
  0.1 21.0 22.5 24.0 25.5 26.9 29.5 31.9 38.0 45.9 
  0.2 21.0 22.2 23.3 24.4 25.5 27.5 29.5 34.8 42.4 
  0.3 21.0 21.8 22.5 23.3 24.0 25.5 26.9 31.3 38.4 
  0.4 21.0 21.4 21.8 22.2 22.5 23.3 24.0 27.4 33.9 
  0.5 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 23.1 28.6 
GR -25.0 0.0 -25.0 -16.9 -9.0 -1.2 6.6 22.0 37.5 56.0 76.2 
  0.1 -25.0 -17.5 -10.1 -2.6 4.8 19.9 35.3 53.9 74.7 
  0.2 -25.0 -18.1 -11.1 -4.1 3.0 17.7 33.0 51.6 73.1 
  0.3 -25.0 -18.7 -12.2 -5.6 1.2 15.4 30.6 49.0 71.3 
  0.4 -25.0 -19.3 -13.3 -7.2 -0.8 12.9 27.9 46.1 69.1 
  0.5 -25.0 -19.9 -14.5 -8.8 -2.8 10.3 25.0 42.9 66.7 
HU 6.0 0.0 6.0 8.3 10.5 -17.5 -13.6 -6.6 -0.4 9.8 18.0 
  0.1 6.0 7.8 9.6 -18.8 -15.2 -8.6 -2.8 7.0 14.9 
  0.2 6.0 7.4 8.7 -20.0 -16.8 -10.8 -5.4 3.8 11.4 
  0.3 6.0 6.9 7.8 -21.3 -18.4 -13.0 -8.2 0.3 7.4 
  0.4 6.0 6.5 6.9 -22.6 -20.1 -15.4 -11.1 -3.6 2.9 
  0.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 -24.0 -21.9 -18.0 -14.3 -7.9 -2.4 
IE -13.0 0.0 -13.0 -5.2 2.4 10.0 17.5 28.4 37.5 56.0 76.2 
  0.1 -13.0 -5.8 1.5 8.7 15.9 26.5 35.3 53.9 74.7 
  0.2 -13.0 -6.3 0.5 7.4 14.4 24.4 33.0 51.6 73.1 
  0.3 -13.0 -6.8 -0.5 6.0 12.7 22.3 30.6 49.0 71.3 
  0.4 -13.0 -7.3 -1.5 4.6 11.0 20.0 27.9 46.1 69.1 
  0.5 -13.0 -7.9 -2.5 3.2 9.2 17.6 25.0 42.9 66.7 
IT 6.5 0.0 6.5 8.8 11.0 13.5 17.4 24.4 30.6 40.8 49.0 
  0.1 6.5 8.3 10.1 12.2 15.8 22.4 28.2 38.0 45.9 
  0.2 6.5 7.9 9.2 11.0 14.2 20.2 25.6 34.8 42.4 
  0.3 6.5 7.4 8.3 9.7 12.6 18.0 22.8 31.3 38.4 
  0.4 6.5 7.0 7.4 8.4 10.9 15.6 19.9 27.4 33.9 
  0.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 7.0 9.1 13.0 16.7 23.1 28.6 
LV 8.0 0.0 8.0 10.2 12.4 14.4 17.4 24.4 30.6 40.8 49.0 
  0.1 8.0 9.8 11.5 13.2 15.8 22.4 28.2 38.0 45.9 
  0.2 8.0 9.4 10.7 12.0 14.2 20.2 25.6 34.8 42.4 
  0.3 8.0 8.9 9.8 10.7 12.6 18.0 22.8 31.3 38.4 
  0.4 8.0 8.5 8.9 9.4 10.9 15.6 19.9 27.4 33.9 
  0.5 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.1 13.0 16.7 23.1 28.6 
LT 8.0 0.0 8.0 10.2 12.4 14.4 17.4 24.4 30.6 40.8 49.0 
  0.1 8.0 9.8 11.5 13.2 15.8 22.4 28.2 38.0 45.9 
  0.2 8.0 9.4 10.7 12.0 14.2 20.2 25.6 34.8 42.4 
  0.3 8.0 8.9 9.8 10.7 12.6 18.0 22.8 31.3 38.4 
  0.4 8.0 8.5 8.9 9.4 10.9 15.6 19.9 27.4 33.9 
  0.5 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.1 13.0 16.7 23.1 28.6 
LU 28.0 0.0 28.0 29.8 31.4 33.0 34.5 37.4 40.0 44.6 49.0 
  0.1 28.0 29.4 30.8 32.1 33.3 35.7 37.9 41.9 45.9 
  0.2 28.0 29.1 30.1 31.1 32.1 33.9 35.7 39.0 42.4 
  0.3 28.0 28.7 29.4 30.1 30.8 32.1 33.3 35.7 38.4 
  0.4 28.0 28.4 28.7 29.1 29.4 30.1 30.8 32.1 33.9 
  0.5 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.6 
NL 6.0 0.0 6.0 8.3 10.5 13.5 17.4 24.4 30.6 40.8 49.0 
  0.1 6.0 7.8 9.6 12.2 15.8 22.4 28.2 38.0 45.9 
  0.2 6.0 7.4 8.7 11.0 14.2 20.2 25.6 34.8 42.4 
  0.3 6.0 6.9 7.8 9.7 12.6 18.0 22.8 31.3 38.4 
  0.4 6.0 6.5 6.9 8.4 10.9 15.6 19.9 27.4 33.9 
  0.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 7.0 9.1 13.0 16.7 23.1 28.6 
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Table 7: continued. 
PL 6.0 0.0 6.0 8.3 10.5 13.5 17.4 24.4 30.6 40.8 49.0 
  0.1 6.0 7.8 9.6 12.2 15.8 22.4 28.2 38.0 45.9 
  0.2 6.0 7.4 8.7 11.0 14.2 20.2 25.6 34.8 42.4 
  0.3 6.0 6.9 7.8 9.7 12.6 18.0 22.8 31.3 38.4 
  0.4 6.0 6.5 6.9 8.4 10.9 15.6 19.9 27.4 33.9 
  0.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 7.0 9.1 13.0 16.7 23.1 28.6 
PT -27.0 0.0 -27.0 -18.9 -10.9 -3.1 4.7 20.3 35.8 56.0 76.2 
  0.1 -27.0 -19.5 -12.0 -4.5 3.0 18.1 33.6 53.9 74.7 
  0.2 -27.0 -20.1 -13.1 -6.0 1.2 15.9 31.3 51.6 73.1 
  0.3 -27.0 -20.7 -14.2 -7.6 -0.7 13.5 28.7 49.0 71.3 
  0.4 -27.0 -21.3 -15.3 -9.1 -2.7 11.0 26.0 46.1 69.1 
  0.5 -27.0 -21.9 -16.5 -10.8 -4.8 8.3 23.0 42.9 66.7 
SK 8.0 0.0 8.0 10.2 12.4 14.4 17.4 24.4 30.6 40.8 49.0 
  0.1 8.0 9.8 11.5 13.2 15.8 22.4 28.2 38.0 45.9 
  0.2 8.0 9.4 10.7 12.0 14.2 20.2 25.6 34.8 42.4 
  0.3 8.0 8.9 9.8 10.7 12.6 18.0 22.8 31.3 38.4 
  0.4 8.0 8.5 8.9 9.4 10.9 15.6 19.9 27.4 33.9 
  0.5 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.1 13.0 16.7 23.1 28.6 
SI 8.0 0.0 8.0 10.2 12.4 14.4 17.4 24.4 30.6 40.8 49.0 
  0.1 8.0 9.8 11.5 13.2 15.8 22.4 28.2 38.0 45.9 
  0.2 8.0 9.4 10.7 12.0 14.2 20.2 25.6 34.8 42.4 
  0.3 8.0 8.9 9.8 10.7 12.6 18.0 22.8 31.3 38.4 
  0.4 8.0 8.5 8.9 9.4 10.9 15.6 19.9 27.4 33.9 
  0.5 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.1 13.0 16.7 23.1 28.6 
ES -15.0 0.0 -15.0 -7.2 0.5 8.1 15.7 28.4 37.5 56.0 76.2 
  0.1 -15.0 -7.7 -0.5 6.8 14.1 26.5 35.3 53.9 74.7 
  0.2 -15.0 -8.2 -1.4 5.5 12.5 24.4 33.0 51.6 73.1 
  0.3 -15.0 -8.8 -2.4 4.1 10.8 22.3 30.6 49.0 71.3 
  0.4 -15.0 -9.3 -3.4 2.7 9.0 20.0 27.9 46.1 69.1 
  0.5 -15.0 -9.9 -4.5 1.2 7.2 17.6 25.0 42.9 66.7 
SE -4.0 0.0 -4.0 3.5 9.8 14.5 19.2 28.4 37.5 56.0 76.2 
  0.1 -4.0 3.1 8.9 13.3 17.7 26.5 35.3 53.9 74.7 
  0.2 -4.0 2.6 8.0 12.1 16.1 24.4 33.0 51.6 73.1 
  0.3 -4.0 2.1 7.1 10.8 14.5 22.3 30.6 49.0 71.3 
  0.4 -4.0 1.6 6.2 9.5 12.9 20.0 27.9 46.1 69.1 
  0.5 -4.0 1.1 5.3 8.1 11.1 17.6 25.0 42.9 66.7 
UK 12.5 0.0 12.5 14.6 16.7 18.6 20.5 24.4 30.6 40.8 49.0 
  0.1 12.5 14.2 15.9 17.5 19.0 22.4 28.2 38.0 45.9 
  0.2 12.5 13.8 15.0 16.3 17.5 20.2 25.6 34.8 42.4 
  0.3 12.5 13.4 14.2 15.0 15.9 18.0 22.8 31.3 38.4 
  0.4 12.5 12.9 13.4 13.8 14.2 15.6 19.9 27.4 33.9 
  0.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 13.0 16.7 23.1 28.6 
EU- 8.0 0.0 8.0 10.2 12.4 14.4 17.4 24.4 30.6 40.8 49.0 
15  0.1 8.0 9.8 11.5 13.2 15.8 22.4 28.2 38.0 45.9 
  0.2 8.0 9.4 10.7 12.0 14.2 20.2 25.6 34.8 42.4 
  0.3 8.0 8.9 9.8 10.7 12.6 18.0 22.8 31.3 38.4 
  0.4 8.0 8.5 8.9 9.4 10.9 15.6 19.9 27.4 33.9 
  0.5 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.1 13.0 16.7 23.1 28.6 
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Table 8: The Und&VT concept applied to the EU-25 Member States (MS) and the 
EU-15 as a whole. The table lists the undershooting U (equations (6), (9), 
(13) and (17)) contained in the modified emission limitation or reduction 
targets 
modδ  listed in Table 7. 
Undershooting U in % for ρ=  
MS KPδ  
% 
α  
1 0% 2.5% 5% 7.5% 10% 15% 20% 30% 40% 
AT 13.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 4.1 6.1 7.9 11.4 17.6 27.8 36.0 
  0.1 0.0 1.7 3.3 4.9 6.4 9.4 15.2 25.0 32.9 
  0.2 0.0 1.3 2.5 3.7 4.9 7.2 12.6 21.8 29.4 
  0.3 0.0 0.9 1.7 2.5 3.3 5.0 9.8 18.3 25.4 
  0.4 0.0 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.6 6.9 14.4 20.9 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 10.1 15.6 
BE 7.5 0.0 0.0 2.3 4.4 6.5 9.9 16.9 23.1 33.3 41.5 
  0.1 0.0 1.8 3.6 5.2 8.3 14.9 20.7 30.5 38.4 
  0.2 0.0 1.4 2.7 4.0 6.7 12.7 18.1 27.3 34.9 
  0.3 0.0 0.9 1.8 2.7 5.1 10.5 15.3 23.8 30.9 
  0.4 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.4 3.4 8.1 12.4 19.9 26.4 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 5.5 9.2 15.6 21.1 
CZ 8.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 4.4 6.4 9.4 16.4 22.6 32.8 41.0 
  0.1 0.0 1.8 3.5 5.2 7.8 14.4 20.2 30.0 37.9 
  0.2 0.0 1.4 2.7 4.0 6.2 12.2 17.6 26.8 34.4 
  0.3 0.0 0.9 1.8 2.7 4.6 10.0 14.8 23.3 30.4 
  0.4 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.4 2.9 7.6 11.9 19.4 25.9 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 5.0 8.7 15.1 20.6 
DK 21.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 3.8 5.5 7.2 10.3 13.2 19.8 28.0 
  0.1 0.0 1.5 3.0 4.5 5.9 8.5 10.9 17.0 24.9 
  0.2 0.0 1.2 2.3 3.4 4.5 6.5 8.5 13.8 21.4 
  0.3 0.0 0.8 1.5 2.3 3.0 4.5 5.9 10.3 17.4 
  0.4 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.5 2.3 3.0 6.4 12.9 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 7.6 
EE 7.5 0.0 0.0 2.2 4.4 6.4 9.4 16.4 22.6 32.8 41.0 
  0.1 0.0 1.8 3.5 5.2 7.8 14.4 20.2 30.0 37.9 
  0.2 0.0 1.4 2.7 4.0 6.2 12.2 17.6 26.8 34.4 
  0.3 0.0 0.9 1.8 2.7 4.6 10.0 14.8 23.3 30.4 
  0.4 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.4 2.9 7.6 11.9 19.4 25.9 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 5.0 8.7 15.1 20.6 
FI 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 9.8 14.5 19.2 28.4 37.5 56.0 76.2 
  0.1 0.0 4.5 8.9 13.3 17.7 26.5 35.3 53.9 74.7 
  0.2 0.0 4.0 8.0 12.1 16.1 24.4 33.0 51.6 73.1 
  0.3 0.0 3.5 7.1 10.8 14.5 22.3 30.6 49.0 71.3 
  0.4 0.0 3.0 6.2 9.5 12.9 20.0 27.9 46.1 69.1 
  0.5 0.0 2.6 5.3 8.1 11.1 17.6 25.0 42.9 66.7 
FR 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 9.8 14.5 19.2 28.4 37.5 56.0 76.2 
  0.1 0.0 4.5 8.9 13.3 17.7 26.5 35.3 53.9 74.7 
  0.2 0.0 4.0 8.0 12.1 16.1 24.4 33.0 51.6 73.1 
  0.3 0.0 3.5 7.1 10.8 14.5 22.3 30.6 49.0 71.3 
  0.4 0.0 3.0 6.2 9.5 12.9 20.0 27.9 46.1 69.1 
  0.5 0.0 2.6 5.3 8.1 11.1 17.6 25.0 42.9 66.7 
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Table 8: continued. 
DE 21.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 3.8 5.5 7.2 10.3 13.2 19.8 28.0 
  0.1 0.0 1.5 3.0 4.5 5.9 8.5 10.9 17.0 24.9 
  0.2 0.0 1.2 2.3 3.4 4.5 6.5 8.5 13.8 21.4 
  0.3 0.0 0.8 1.5 2.3 3.0 4.5 5.9 10.3 17.4 
  0.4 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.5 2.3 3.0 6.4 12.9 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 7.6 
GR -25.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 16.0 23.8 31.6 47.0 62.5 81.0 101.2 
  0.1 0.0 7.5 14.9 22.4 29.8 44.9 60.3 78.9 99.7 
  0.2 0.0 6.9 13.9 20.9 28.0 42.7 58.0 76.6 98.1 
  0.3 0.0 6.3 12.8 19.4 26.2 40.4 55.6 74.0 96.3 
  0.4 0.0 5.7 11.7 17.8 24.2 37.9 52.9 71.1 94.1 
  0.5 0.0 5.1 10.5 16.2 22.2 35.3 50.0 67.9 91.7 
HU 6.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 4.5 7.5 11.4 18.4 24.6 34.8 43.0 
  0.1 0.0 1.8 3.6 6.2 9.8 16.4 22.2 32.0 39.9 
  0.2 0.0 1.4 2.7 5.0 8.2 14.2 19.6 28.8 36.4 
  0.3 0.0 0.9 1.8 3.7 6.6 12.0 16.8 25.3 32.4 
  0.4 0.0 0.5 0.9 2.4 4.9 9.6 13.9 21.4 27.9 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.1 7.0 10.7 17.1 22.6 
IE -13.0 0.0 0.0 7.8 15.4 23.0 30.5 41.4 50.5 69.0 89.2 
  0.1 0.0 7.2 14.5 21.7 28.9 39.5 48.3 66.9 87.7 
  0.2 0.0 6.7 13.5 20.4 27.4 37.4 46.0 64.6 86.1 
  0.3 0.0 6.2 12.5 19.0 25.7 35.3 43.6 62.0 84.3 
  0.4 0.0 5.7 11.5 17.6 24.0 33.0 40.9 59.1 82.1 
  0.5 0.0 5.1 10.5 16.2 22.2 30.6 38.0 55.9 79.7 
IT 6.5 0.0 0.0 2.3 4.5 7.0 10.9 17.9 24.1 34.3 42.5 
  0.1 0.0 1.8 3.6 5.7 9.3 15.9 21.7 31.5 39.4 
  0.2 0.0 1.4 2.7 4.5 7.7 13.7 19.1 28.3 35.9 
  0.3 0.0 0.9 1.8 3.2 6.1 11.5 16.3 24.8 31.9 
  0.4 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.9 4.4 9.1 13.4 20.9 27.4 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.6 6.5 10.2 16.6 22.1 
LV 8.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 4.4 6.4 9.4 16.4 22.6 32.8 41.0 
  0.1 0.0 1.8 3.5 5.2 7.8 14.4 20.2 30.0 37.9 
  0.2 0.0 1.4 2.7 4.0 6.2 12.2 17.6 26.8 34.4 
  0.3 0.0 0.9 1.8 2.7 4.6 10.0 14.8 23.3 30.4 
  0.4 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.4 2.9 7.6 11.9 19.4 25.9 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 5.0 8.7 15.1 20.6 
LT 8.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 4.4 6.4 9.4 16.4 22.6 32.8 41.0 
  0.1 0.0 1.8 3.5 5.2 7.8 14.4 20.2 30.0 37.9 
  0.2 0.0 1.4 2.7 4.0 6.2 12.2 17.6 26.8 34.4 
  0.3 0.0 0.9 1.8 2.7 4.6 10.0 14.8 23.3 30.4 
  0.4 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.4 2.9 7.6 11.9 19.4 25.9 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 5.0 8.7 15.1 20.6 
LU 28.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 3.4 5.0 6.5 9.4 12.0 16.6 21.0 
  0.1 0.0 1.4 2.8 4.1 5.3 7.7 9.9 13.9 17.9 
  0.2 0.0 1.1 2.1 3.1 4.1 5.9 7.7 11.0 14.4 
  0.3 0.0 0.7 1.4 2.1 2.8 4.1 5.3 7.7 10.4 
  0.4 0.0 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.4 2.1 2.8 4.1 5.9 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
NL 6.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 4.5 7.5 11.4 18.4 24.6 34.8 43.0 
  0.1 0.0 1.8 3.6 6.2 9.8 16.4 22.2 32.0 39.9 
  0.2 0.0 1.4 2.7 5.0 8.2 14.2 19.6 28.8 36.4 
  0.3 0.0 0.9 1.8 3.7 6.6 12.0 16.8 25.3 32.4 
  0.4 0.0 0.5 0.9 2.4 4.9 9.6 13.9 21.4 27.9 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.1 7.0 10.7 17.1 22.6 
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Table 8: continued. 
PL 6.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 4.5 7.5 11.4 18.4 24.6 34.8 43.0 
  0.1 0.0 1.8 3.6 6.2 9.8 16.4 22.2 32.0 39.9 
  0.2 0.0 1.4 2.7 5.0 8.2 14.2 19.6 28.8 36.4 
  0.3 0.0 0.9 1.8 3.7 6.6 12.0 16.8 25.3 32.4 
  0.4 0.0 0.5 0.9 2.4 4.9 9.6 13.9 21.4 27.9 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.1 7.0 10.7 17.1 22.6 
PT -27.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 16.1 23.9 31.7 47.3 62.8 83.0 103.2 
  0.1 0.0 7.5 15.0 22.5 30.0 45.1 60.6 80.9 101.7 
  0.2 0.0 6.9 13.9 21.0 28.2 42.9 58.3 78.6 100.1 
  0.3 0.0 6.3 12.8 19.4 26.3 40.5 55.7 76.0 98.3 
  0.4 0.0 5.7 11.7 17.9 24.3 38.0 53.0 73.1 96.1 
  0.5 0.0 5.1 10.5 16.2 22.2 35.3 50.0 69.9 93.7 
SK 8.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 4.4 6.4 9.4 16.4 22.6 32.8 41.0 
  0.1 0.0 1.8 3.5 5.2 7.8 14.4 20.2 30.0 37.9 
  0.2 0.0 1.4 2.7 4.0 6.2 12.2 17.6 26.8 34.4 
  0.3 0.0 0.9 1.8 2.7 4.6 10.0 14.8 23.3 30.4 
  0.4 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.4 2.9 7.6 11.9 19.4 25.9 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 5.0 8.7 15.1 20.6 
SI 8.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 4.4 6.4 9.4 16.4 22.6 32.8 41.0 
  0.1 0.0 1.8 3.5 5.2 7.8 14.4 20.2 30.0 37.9 
  0.2 0.0 1.4 2.7 4.0 6.2 12.2 17.6 26.8 34.4 
  0.3 0.0 0.9 1.8 2.7 4.6 10.0 14.8 23.3 30.4 
  0.4 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.4 2.9 7.6 11.9 19.4 25.9 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 5.0 8.7 15.1 20.6 
ES -15.0 0.0 0.0 7.8 15.5 23.1 30.7 43.4 52.5 71.0 91.2 
  0.1 0.0 7.3 14.5 21.8 29.1 41.5 50.3 68.9 89.7 
  0.2 0.0 6.8 13.6 20.5 27.5 39.4 48.0 66.6 88.1 
  0.3 0.0 6.2 12.6 19.1 25.8 37.3 45.6 64.0 86.3 
  0.4 0.0 5.7 11.6 17.7 24.0 35.0 42.9 61.1 84.1 
  0.5 0.0 5.1 10.5 16.2 22.2 32.6 40.0 57.9 81.7 
SE -4.0 0.0 0.0 7.5 13.8 18.5 23.2 32.4 41.5 60.0 80.2 
  0.1 0.0 7.1 12.9 17.3 21.7 30.5 39.3 57.9 78.7 
  0.2 0.0 6.6 12.0 16.1 20.1 28.4 37.0 55.6 77.1 
  0.3 0.0 6.1 11.1 14.8 18.5 26.3 34.6 53.0 75.3 
  0.4 0.0 5.6 10.2 13.5 16.9 24.0 31.9 50.1 73.1 
  0.5 0.0 5.1 9.3 12.1 15.1 21.6 29.0 46.9 70.7 
UK 12.5 0.0 0.0 2.1 4.2 6.1 8.0 11.9 18.1 28.3 36.5 
  0.1 0.0 1.7 3.4 5.0 6.5 9.9 15.7 25.5 33.4 
  0.2 0.0 1.3 2.5 3.8 5.0 7.7 13.1 22.3 29.9 
  0.3 0.0 0.9 1.7 2.5 3.4 5.5 10.3 18.8 25.9 
  0.4 0.0 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.7 3.1 7.4 14.9 21.4 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 4.2 10.6 16.1 
EU- 8.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 4.4 6.4 9.4 16.4 22.6 32.8 41.0 
15  0.1 0.0 1.8 3.5 5.2 7.8 14.4 20.2 30.0 37.9 
  0.2 0.0 1.4 2.7 4.0 6.2 12.2 17.6 26.8 34.4 
  0.3 0.0 0.9 1.8 2.7 4.6 10.0 14.8 23.3 30.4 
  0.4 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.4 2.9 7.6 11.9 19.4 25.9 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 5.0 8.7 15.1 20.6 
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Table 9: The undershooting U listed in Table 8 multiplied with the factor ( 2013− ) 
to reconcile the Und&VT concept with the emissions reporting for the EU 
and to establish the linear path undershooting targets for 2003. 
Undershooting U in % for ρ=  
MS KPδ  
% 
α  
1 0% 2.5% 5% 7.5% 10% 15% 20% 30% 40% 
AT 13.0 0.0 0.0 -1.4 -2.7 -3.9 -5.1 -7.4 -11.4 -18.1 -23.4 
  0.1 0.0 -1.1 -2.2 -3.2 -4.2 -6.1 -9.9 -16.2 -21.4 
  0.2 0.0 -0.8 -1.6 -2.4 -3.2 -4.7 -8.2 -14.2 -19.1 
  0.3 0.0 -0.6 -1.1 -1.6 -2.2 -3.2 -6.4 -11.9 -16.5 
  0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.8 -1.1 -1.7 -4.5 -9.4 -13.6 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.4 -6.6 -10.1 
BE 7.5 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -2.9 -4.2 -6.4 -11.0 -15.0 -21.7 -27.0 
  0.1 0.0 -1.2 -2.3 -3.4 -5.4 -9.7 -13.4 -19.8 -25.0 
  0.2 0.0 -0.9 -1.8 -2.6 -4.4 -8.3 -11.8 -17.8 -22.7 
  0.3 0.0 -0.6 -1.2 -1.8 -3.3 -6.8 -10.0 -15.5 -20.1 
  0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -2.2 -5.2 -8.0 -13.0 -17.1 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -3.6 -6.0 -10.1 -13.7 
CZ 8.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -2.8 -4.2 -6.1 -10.7 -14.7 -21.3 -26.6 
  0.1 0.0 -1.2 -2.3 -3.4 -5.1 -9.3 -13.1 -19.5 -24.6 
  0.2 0.0 -0.9 -1.7 -2.6 -4.1 -7.9 -11.4 -17.4 -22.4 
  0.3 0.0 -0.6 -1.2 -1.7 -3.0 -6.5 -9.6 -15.2 -19.8 
  0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -1.9 -4.9 -7.7 -12.6 -16.8 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -3.3 -5.6 -9.8 -13.4 
DK 21.0 0.0 0.0 -1.3 -2.4 -3.6 -4.7 -6.7 -8.6 -12.9 -18.2 
  0.1 0.0 -1.0 -2.0 -2.9 -3.8 -5.5 -7.1 -11.0 -16.2 
  0.2 0.0 -0.8 -1.5 -2.2 -2.9 -4.2 -5.5 -9.0 -13.9 
  0.3 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 -2.0 -2.9 -3.8 -6.7 -11.3 
  0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -1.0 -1.5 -2.0 -4.2 -8.4 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.4 -4.9 
EE 7.5 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -2.8 -4.2 -6.1 -10.7 -14.7 -21.3 -26.6 
  0.1 0.0 -1.2 -2.3 -3.4 -5.1 -9.3 -13.1 -19.5 -24.6 
  0.2 0.0 -0.9 -1.7 -2.6 -4.1 -7.9 -11.4 -17.4 -22.4 
  0.3 0.0 -0.6 -1.2 -1.7 -3.0 -6.5 -9.6 -15.2 -19.8 
  0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -1.9 -4.9 -7.7 -12.6 -16.8 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -3.3 -5.6 -9.8 -13.4 
FI 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3.2 -6.4 -9.4 -12.5 -18.5 -24.4 -36.4 -49.5 
  0.1 0.0 -2.9 -5.8 -8.7 -11.5 -17.2 -23.0 -35.0 -48.6 
  0.2 0.0 -2.6 -5.2 -7.8 -10.5 -15.9 -21.5 -33.5 -47.5 
  0.3 0.0 -2.3 -4.6 -7.0 -9.4 -14.5 -19.9 -31.8 -46.3 
  0.4 0.0 -2.0 -4.0 -6.2 -8.4 -13.0 -18.1 -30.0 -44.9 
  0.5 0.0 -1.7 -3.4 -5.3 -7.2 -11.5 -16.3 -27.9 -43.3 
FR 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3.2 -6.4 -9.4 -12.5 -18.5 -24.4 -36.4 -49.5 
  0.1 0.0 -2.9 -5.8 -8.7 -11.5 -17.2 -23.0 -35.0 -48.6 
  0.2 0.0 -2.6 -5.2 -7.8 -10.5 -15.9 -21.5 -33.5 -47.5 
  0.3 0.0 -2.3 -4.6 -7.0 -9.4 -14.5 -19.9 -31.8 -46.3 
  0.4 0.0 -2.0 -4.0 -6.2 -8.4 -13.0 -18.1 -30.0 -44.9 
  0.5 0.0 -1.7 -3.4 -5.3 -7.2 -11.5 -16.3 -27.9 -43.3 
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Table 9: continued. 
DE 21.0 0.0 0.0 -1.3 -2.4 -3.6 -4.7 -6.7 -8.6 -12.9 -18.2 
  0.1 0.0 -1.0 -2.0 -2.9 -3.8 -5.5 -7.1 -11.0 -16.2 
  0.2 0.0 -0.8 -1.5 -2.2 -2.9 -4.2 -5.5 -9.0 -13.9 
  0.3 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 -2.0 -2.9 -3.8 -6.7 -11.3 
  0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -1.0 -1.5 -2.0 -4.2 -8.4 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.4 -4.9 
GR -25.0 0.0 0.0 -5.2 -10.4 -15.5 -20.5 -30.5 -40.6 -52.7 -65.8 
  0.1 0.0 -4.9 -9.7 -14.5 -19.4 -29.2 -39.2 -51.3 -64.8 
  0.2 0.0 -4.5 -9.0 -13.6 -18.2 -27.8 -37.7 -49.8 -63.8 
  0.3 0.0 -4.1 -8.3 -12.6 -17.0 -26.2 -36.1 -48.1 -62.6 
  0.4 0.0 -3.7 -7.6 -11.6 -15.8 -24.6 -34.4 -46.2 -61.2 
  0.5 0.0 -3.3 -6.8 -10.5 -14.4 -22.9 -32.5 -44.1 -59.6 
HU 6.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -2.9 -4.9 -7.4 -12.0 -16.0 -22.6 -27.9 
  0.1 0.0 -1.2 -2.4 -4.1 -6.4 -10.6 -14.4 -20.8 -25.9 
  0.2 0.0 -0.9 -1.8 -3.2 -5.4 -9.2 -12.7 -18.7 -23.7 
  0.3 0.0 -0.6 -1.2 -2.4 -4.3 -7.8 -10.9 -16.5 -21.1 
  0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -1.5 -3.2 -6.2 -9.0 -13.9 -18.1 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -2.0 -4.6 -6.9 -11.1 -14.7 
IE -13.0 0.0 0.0 -5.0 -10.0 -14.9 -19.8 -26.9 -32.8 -44.9 -58.0 
  0.1 0.0 -4.7 -9.4 -14.1 -18.8 -25.7 -31.4 -43.5 -57.0 
  0.2 0.0 -4.4 -8.8 -13.2 -17.8 -24.3 -29.9 -42.0 -56.0 
  0.3 0.0 -4.0 -8.1 -12.4 -16.7 -23.0 -28.3 -40.3 -54.8 
  0.4 0.0 -3.7 -7.5 -11.5 -15.6 -21.5 -26.6 -38.4 -53.4 
  0.5 0.0 -3.3 -6.8 -10.5 -14.4 -19.9 -24.7 -36.3 -51.8 
IT 6.5 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -2.9 -4.5 -7.1 -11.6 -15.6 -22.3 -27.6 
  0.1 0.0 -1.2 -2.3 -3.7 -6.1 -10.3 -14.1 -20.5 -25.6 
  0.2 0.0 -0.9 -1.8 -2.9 -5.0 -8.9 -12.4 -18.4 -23.3 
  0.3 0.0 -0.6 -1.2 -2.1 -4.0 -7.5 -10.6 -16.1 -20.8 
  0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -1.2 -2.8 -5.9 -8.7 -13.6 -17.8 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -1.7 -4.3 -6.6 -10.8 -14.3 
LV 8.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -2.8 -4.2 -6.1 -10.7 -14.7 -21.3 -26.6 
  0.1 0.0 -1.2 -2.3 -3.4 -5.1 -9.3 -13.1 -19.5 -24.6 
  0.2 0.0 -0.9 -1.7 -2.6 -4.1 -7.9 -11.4 -17.4 -22.4 
  0.3 0.0 -0.6 -1.2 -1.7 -3.0 -6.5 -9.6 -15.2 -19.8 
  0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -1.9 -4.9 -7.7 -12.6 -16.8 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -3.3 -5.6 -9.8 -13.4 
LT 8.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -2.8 -4.2 -6.1 -10.7 -14.7 -21.3 -26.6 
  0.1 0.0 -1.2 -2.3 -3.4 -5.1 -9.3 -13.1 -19.5 -24.6 
  0.2 0.0 -0.9 -1.7 -2.6 -4.1 -7.9 -11.4 -17.4 -22.4 
  0.3 0.0 -0.6 -1.2 -1.7 -3.0 -6.5 -9.6 -15.2 -19.8 
  0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -1.9 -4.9 -7.7 -12.6 -16.8 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -3.3 -5.6 -9.8 -13.4 
LU 28.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -2.2 -3.3 -4.3 -6.1 -7.8 -10.8 -13.6 
  0.1 0.0 -0.9 -1.8 -2.6 -3.5 -5.0 -6.5 -9.1 -11.6 
  0.2 0.0 -0.7 -1.4 -2.0 -2.6 -3.9 -5.0 -7.1 -9.4 
  0.3 0.0 -0.5 -0.9 -1.4 -1.8 -2.6 -3.5 -5.0 -6.8 
  0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 -0.7 -0.9 -1.4 -1.8 -2.6 -3.8 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 
NL 6.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -2.9 -4.9 -7.4 -12.0 -16.0 -22.6 -27.9 
  0.1 0.0 -1.2 -2.4 -4.1 -6.4 -10.6 -14.4 -20.8 -25.9 
  0.2 0.0 -0.9 -1.8 -3.2 -5.4 -9.2 -12.7 -18.7 -23.7 
  0.3 0.0 -0.6 -1.2 -2.4 -4.3 -7.8 -10.9 -16.5 -21.1 
  0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -1.5 -3.2 -6.2 -9.0 -13.9 -18.1 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -2.0 -4.6 -6.9 -11.1 -14.7 
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Table 9: continued. 
PL 6.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -2.9 -4.9 -7.4 -12.0 -16.0 -22.6 -27.9 
  0.1 0.0 -1.2 -2.4 -4.1 -6.4 -10.6 -14.4 -20.8 -25.9 
  0.2 0.0 -0.9 -1.8 -3.2 -5.4 -9.2 -12.7 -18.7 -23.7 
  0.3 0.0 -0.6 -1.2 -2.4 -4.3 -7.8 -10.9 -16.5 -21.1 
  0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -1.5 -3.2 -6.2 -9.0 -13.9 -18.1 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -2.0 -4.6 -6.9 -11.1 -14.7 
PT -27.0 0.0 0.0 -5.3 -10.4 -15.6 -20.6 -30.7 -40.8 -54.0 -67.1 
  0.1 0.0 -4.9 -9.8 -14.6 -19.5 -29.3 -39.4 -52.6 -66.1 
  0.2 0.0 -4.5 -9.0 -13.6 -18.3 -27.9 -37.9 -51.1 -65.1 
  0.3 0.0 -4.1 -8.3 -12.6 -17.1 -26.3 -36.2 -49.4 -63.9 
  0.4 0.0 -3.7 -7.6 -11.6 -15.8 -24.7 -34.4 -47.5 -62.5 
  0.5 0.0 -3.3 -6.8 -10.5 -14.4 -22.9 -32.5 -45.4 -60.9 
SK 8.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -2.8 -4.2 -6.1 -10.7 -14.7 -21.3 -26.6 
  0.1 0.0 -1.2 -2.3 -3.4 -5.1 -9.3 -13.1 -19.5 -24.6 
  0.2 0.0 -0.9 -1.7 -2.6 -4.1 -7.9 -11.4 -17.4 -22.4 
  0.3 0.0 -0.6 -1.2 -1.7 -3.0 -6.5 -9.6 -15.2 -19.8 
  0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -1.9 -4.9 -7.7 -12.6 -16.8 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -3.3 -5.6 -9.8 -13.4 
SI 8.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -2.8 -4.2 -6.1 -10.7 -14.7 -21.3 -26.6 
  0.1 0.0 -1.2 -2.3 -3.4 -5.1 -9.3 -13.1 -19.5 -24.6 
  0.2 0.0 -0.9 -1.7 -2.6 -4.1 -7.9 -11.4 -17.4 -22.4 
  0.3 0.0 -0.6 -1.2 -1.7 -3.0 -6.5 -9.6 -15.2 -19.8 
  0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -1.9 -4.9 -7.7 -12.6 -16.8 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -3.3 -5.6 -9.8 -13.4 
ES -15.0 0.0 0.0 -5.1 -10.1 -15.0 -19.9 -28.2 -34.1 -46.2 -59.3 
  0.1 0.0 -4.7 -9.5 -14.2 -18.9 -27.0 -32.7 -44.8 -58.3 
  0.2 0.0 -4.4 -8.8 -13.3 -17.9 -25.6 -31.2 -43.3 -57.3 
  0.3 0.0 -4.0 -8.2 -12.4 -16.8 -24.3 -29.6 -41.6 -56.1 
  0.4 0.0 -3.7 -7.5 -11.5 -15.6 -22.8 -27.9 -39.7 -54.7 
  0.5 0.0 -3.3 -6.8 -10.5 -14.4 -21.2 -26.0 -37.6 -53.1 
SE -4.0 0.0 0.0 -4.9 -9.0 -12.0 -15.1 -21.1 -27.0 -39.0 -52.1 
  0.1 0.0 -4.6 -8.4 -11.3 -14.1 -19.8 -25.6 -37.6 -51.2 
  0.2 0.0 -4.3 -7.8 -10.4 -13.1 -18.5 -24.1 -36.1 -50.1 
  0.3 0.0 -4.0 -7.2 -9.6 -12.0 -17.1 -22.5 -34.4 -48.9 
  0.4 0.0 -3.7 -6.6 -8.8 -11.0 -15.6 -20.7 -32.6 -47.5 
  0.5 0.0 -3.3 -6.0 -7.9 -9.8 -14.1 -18.9 -30.5 -45.9 
UK 12.5 0.0 0.0 -1.4 -2.7 -4.0 -5.2 -7.7 -11.7 -18.4 -23.7 
  0.1 0.0 -1.1 -2.2 -3.2 -4.2 -6.4 -10.2 -16.6 -21.7 
  0.2 0.0 -0.8 -1.7 -2.4 -3.2 -5.0 -8.5 -14.5 -19.4 
  0.3 0.0 -0.6 -1.1 -1.7 -2.2 -3.6 -6.7 -12.2 -16.9 
  0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.8 -1.1 -2.0 -4.8 -9.7 -13.9 
  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -2.7 -6.9 -10.4 
EU- -5.2 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -2.8 -4.2 -6.1 -10.7 -14.7 -21.3 -26.6 
15   0.1 0.0 -1.2 -2.3 -3.4 -5.1 -9.3 -13.1 -19.5 -24.6 
   0.2 0.0 -0.9 -1.7 -2.6 -4.1 -7.9 -11.4 -17.4 -22.4 
   0.3 0.0 -0.6 -1.2 -1.7 -3.0 -6.5 -9.6 -15.2 -19.8 
   0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -1.9 -4.9 -7.7 -12.6 -16.8 
   0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -3.3 -5.6 -9.8 -13.4 
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4 Interpretation of Results and Conclusions 
To interpret the results for 2003, the following are displayed: 
(I) U by ρ  with α  as a parameter; 
i.e., the Member States’ undershooting U that matches the relative uncertainty ρ  
in the intervals [ [0,5 , [ [5,10 , [ [10, 20  and [ [20, 40 %, while the risk α takes on the 
values 0, 0.1, …, 0.5. 
(II) U by α  with ρ  as a parameter; 
i.e., the Member States’ undershooting U that matches the risk 0.5α=  and α in 
the intervals [ [0.4,0.5 , [ [0.3,0.4 , [ [0.2,0.3 , [ [0.1,0.2  and [ [0,0.1 , while the 
relative uncertainty ρ  takes on the values 5, 10, 20 and 40%. 
With respect to ρ , Jonas and Nilsson (2001: Section 4.1.3) is followed, who 
recommend the application of relative uncertainty classes as a common good practice 
measure. The classes constitute a robust means to get an effective grip on uncertainties 
in light of the numerous data limitations and intra and inter-country inconsistencies, 
which do not justify the reporting of exact relative uncertainties. The procedure with 
respect to α  is similar. 
The DTIs displayed in Figure 2 are always shown to contrast the Member States’ linear 
path undershooting targets for the year 2003 with their actual emission situation in that 
year. 
(I) U by ρ with α as a parameter. Figure 5 displays U by ρ  for 0.5α= . For this α 
value, U equals zero (Case 1: equations (6)) or GapU 0>  (Cases 2–4: equations (9), (13) 
and (17) in which GapU  is > 0 because it has not yet been multiplied with the factor 
( 2013− )). GapU  is the initial or obligatory undershooting that is required to achieve 
detectability before the Member States are permitted to make economic use of any 
excess emission reductions.  
GapU  is a function of critδ  (Equations (10), (14) and (18)) and thus of ρ (Equation (1)). 
This explains the different initial or obligatory undershooting that Member States have 
to fulfill in dependence of the relative uncertainty with which they report their 
emissions. Of interest here are the eleven countries that exhibit a negative DTI: CZ, DE, 
EE, FR, HU, LT, LV, PL, SE, SK and the UK (Figure 2). Given 0.5α= , LT, LV, EE, 
PL, HU, SK and CZ are the best potential sellers followed by DE, the UK, SE and FR 
(Figure 5). LT, LV, EE, PL, HU, SK and CZ can report with a relative uncertainty > 
40% and still exhibit a detectable signal; while DE must report with a relative 
uncertainty of up to 40% (rounded), the UK with a relative uncertainty falling into the 
interval [ [40,20  (more exactly: up to 26%), and both SE and FR even with a relative 
uncertainty falling into the interval [ [5,0  (more exactly: up to 3.6% and 2.8% 
respectively).10 
Figures 6–10 display U by ρ  for 0.4,...,0.0α= . These figures can be interpreted 
similarly to Figure 5, bearing in mind that U increases in absolute terms with decreasing 
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α . For 0.0α=  (Figure 10), LT, LV, EE and PL can still report with a relative 
uncertainty > 40% and HU with a relative uncertainty of up to 40% (rounded); while 
both SK and CZ must report with a relative uncertainty falling into the interval [ [20, 40  
(more exactly: up to 33% and 26%, respectively), both the UK and DE with a relative 
uncertainty falling into the interval [ [10, 20  (more exactly: up 10%), and both SE and 
FR even with a relative uncertainty falling into the interval [ [0,5 % (more exactly: up to 
2.6% and 1.5%, respectively).11 
(II) U by a with ρ as a parameter. Figure 11 displays U by α  for 5%ρ= . For this ρ  
value, a white bar or, equivalently, a GapU 0<  (i.e., > 0 if the factor ( 2013− ) is 
disregarded) appears only for Member States committed to emission limitation (ES, FI, 
FR, GR, IE, PT and SE; see Table 1). A GapU 0<  satisfies the demand for detectable 
signals. As it becomes obvious, the white bars represent the major part of U. Their 
length is equivalent to the length of the green bars in Figure 5. 
With increasing ρ  (Figures 12–14), an increasing number of Member States committed 
to emission reduction also exhibit a GapU 0< , for 40%=ρ  eventually all of them 
(Figure 14). For 10%ρ= , the length of the white bars is equivalent to the combined 
length of the green and yellow bars in Figure 5; and so on until Figure 14 ( 40%ρ= ), 
where the length of the white bars is equivalent to the combined length of the green, 
yellow, orange and red bars in Figure 5. In general, Figures 12–14 resolve GapU  better 
than the remainder of U. 
Here, interpretation I (U by ρ with α as a parameter; Figures 5–10) is preferred over 
interpretation II (U by α  with ρ  as a parameter; Figures 11–14), as the use of α  
instead of ρ  as a parameter appears to be more readily acceptable. Nevertheless, 
Figures 11–14 are well suited to quickly survey GapU  and analyze which Member State 
with a negative DTI meets GapU  for a given ρ . (The UK, e.g., meets GapU  for 20%=ρ  
but not any more for 40%=ρ ; Figures 13 and 14.) 
The following four conclusions emerge from this study: 
(1) Jonas et al. (2004a) motivated the application of preparatory signal detection in the 
context of the Kyoto Protocol as a necessary measure that should have been taken 
prior to/in negotiating the Protocol. To these ends, the authors have applied four 
preparatory signal detection techniques to the Annex I countries under the Kyoto 
Protocol. The frame of reference for preparatory signal detection is that Annex I 
countries comply with their committed emission targets in 2008–2012.  By contrast, 
in this study one of these techniques, the Und&VT concept, is applied to the old and 
new Member States of the European Union under the EU burden sharing in 
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, but with reference to the linear path (base 
year–commitment year) undershooting targets in 2003. The exercise shows that 
preparatory signal detection can also be applied in connection with intermediate 
emission targets. 
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(2) To advance the reporting of the EU, uncertainty and its consequences are taken into 
consideration in addition to the DTI, i.e., (i) the risk that a Member State’s true 
emissions in the commitment year/period are above its true EU reference line; and 
(ii) the detectability of its target. It is anticipated that the evaluation of emission 
signals in terms of risk and detectability will become standard practice and that 
these two qualifiers will be accounted for in pricing GHG emission permits. 
(3) In 2003 eleven EU-25 Member States exhibit a negative DTI and thus appear as 
potential sellers: CZ, DE, EE, FR, HU, LT, LV, PL, SE, SK and the UK (Figure 2). 
However, expecting that all of the EU Member States will eventually exhibit 
relative uncertainties in the range of 5–10% and above rather than below excluding 
LUCF and Kyoto mechanisms (confer Table 2: so far, quantified uncertainty 
estimates are only available from twelve old and two new EU-25 Member States), 
the Member States require considerable undershooting of their EU-compatible, but 
detectable, targets if one wants to keep the risk low ( 0.1α≈ ) that the Member 
States’ true emissions in the commitment year/period are above their true EU 
reference lines. These conditions are met differently: Potential low-risk sellers 
(Figure 9: ranked in terms of credibility) are LT, LV, EE, PL and HU which can 
even report with a relative uncertainty > 40% and still exhibit a detectable signal; 
while SK and CZ, and DE and the UK can still report within the 20–40% and 10–
20% relative uncertainty class, respectively. In contrast, FR and SE can only act as 
potential high-risk sellers ( 0.5=α ) within the 0–5% relative uncertainty class 
(Figure 5). The other EU-25 Member States exhibit positive DTIs, i.e., they do not 
meet their linear path (base year–commitment year) undershooting targets in 2003, 
or do not have Kyoto targets at all (CY and MT). 
(4) The Und&VT concept requires detectable signals. Measuring emission reductions 
negatively and emission increases positively (i.e., in line with the reporting for the 
EU), it can be stated that the greater the committed emission limitation or reduction 
targets KPδ  and the greater the relative uncertainty ρ, with which Member States 
report their emissions, the smaller the initial or obligatory undershooting GapU  is to 
achieve detectability. That is, for 5%ρ=  only the Member States committed to 
emission limitation (ES, FI, FR, GR, IE, PT and SE) require a GapU 0< . For these 
Member States, GapU  represents the major part of the undershooting U (Figure 11). 
For 10%ρ= , BE, IT, the NL as well as the EU-15 also require a GapU 0<  (Figure 
12; here: Member States with GapU DTI< ), indicating that somewhere within the 
5–10% relative uncertainty range non-detectability will become a problem also for 
these Member States. The maximal (critical) relative uncertainties, with which they 
can report their emissions without compromising detectability, can be determined 
(Jonas et al., 2004b: Section 3.1); these are, in absolute terms and with reference to 
2010, 8.1% (BE), 7.0% (IT), 6.4% (NL) and 8.7% (EU-15), respectively, assuming 
that the emission limitation or reduction targets are met under the EU burden 
sharing in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. From these numbers it becomes 
clear that the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol were imprudent because they did 
not consider the consequences of uncertainty. 
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Figure 5: U by ρ  (see intervals) for 0.5α=  in addition to the DTI. 
 26
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Figure 6: U by ρ  (see intervals) for 0.4α=  in addition to the DTI. 
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Figure 7: U by ρ  (see intervals) for 0.3α=  in addition to the DTI. 
 28
Required Undershooting for 2003: alpha = 0.2
3.5
-61.0
-53.3
-45.6
-28.2
-28.0
-23.0
-19.1
-4.8
-5.0
-5.2
-1.9
3.3
4.7
5.5
6.7
7.0
15.9
16.7
19.1
20.0
21.5
25.0
30.9
-70.0 -60.0 -50.0 -40.0 -30.0 -20.0 -10.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0
ES
AT
FI
DK
PT
IE
IT
GR
LU
BE
NL
SI
FR
DE
SE
UK
CZ
SK
HU
PL
EE
LV
LT
EU-15
0 - 5% 5  -10% 10 - 20% 20 - 40% DTI
 
Figure 8: U by ρ  (see intervals) for 0.2α=  in addition to the DTI. 
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Figure 9: U by ρ  (see intervals) for 0.1α=  in addition to the DTI. 
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Figure 10: U by ρ  (see intervals) for 0.0α=  in addition to the DTI. 
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-61.0
-53.3
-45.6
-28.2
-28.0
-23.0
-19.1
25.0
21.5
20.0
19.1
16.7
15.9
7.0
6.7
5.5
4.7
3.3
-1.9
-4.8
-5.0
-5.2
30.9
3.5
-70.0 -60.0 -50.0 -40.0 -30.0 -20.0 -10.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0
ES
AT
FI
DK
PT
IE
IT
GR
LU
BE
NL
SI
FR
DE
SE
UK
CZ
SK
HU
PL
EE
LV
LT
EU-15
0.5 0.4 – 0.5 0.3 – 0.4 0.2 – 0.3 0.1 – 0.2 0.0 – 0.1 DTI
 
Figure 11: U by α  (see value and intervals) for 5%ρ=  in addition to the DTI. 
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Figure 12: U by α  (see value and intervals) for 10%ρ=  in addition to the DTI. 
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Figure 13: U by α  (see value and intervals) for 20%ρ=  in addition to the DTI. 
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Required Undershooting for 2003: rho = 40%
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Figure 14: U by α  (see value and intervals) for 40%ρ=  in addition to the DTI. 
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Acronyms and Nomenclature 
EU European Union 
DTI Distance-to-Target Indicator 
GHG Greenhouse Gas 
KP Kyoto Protocol 
LUCF Land-use Change and Forestry 
MS Member State 
Und Undershooting 
Und&VT Undershooting and Verification Time 
VT Verification Time 
 
crit critical 
mod modified 
t true 
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ISO Country Code 
AT Austria 
BE Belgium 
CY Cyprus 
CZ Czech Republic 
DE Germany 
DK Denmark 
EE Estonia 
ES Spain 
FI Finland 
FR France 
GR Greece 
HU Hungary 
IE Ireland 
IT Italy 
LT Lithuania 
LU Luxembourg 
LV Latvia 
MT Malta 
NL Netherlands 
PL Poland 
PT Portugal 
SE Sweden 
SI Slovenia 
SK Slovakia 
UK United Kingdom 
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Endnotes 
                                               
1
 Preparatory signal detection allows generating useful information beforehand as to how great 
uncertainties can be depending on the level of confidence of the emission signal or the signal one wishes 
to detect and the risk one is willing to tolerate in not meeting an agreed emission limitation or reduction 
commitment. It is this knowledge of the required quality of reporting versus uncertainty that one wishes 
to have at hand before negotiating international environmental treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol. It is 
generally assumed that the emissions path between the base year and commitment year/period is a straight 
line, and the path of historical emissions is not taken into consideration. 
2
 The term ‘verification time’ was first used by Jonas et al. (1999) and by other authors since then. 
Actually, a more correct term is ‘detection time’. The detection of emission changes does not imply the 
verification of emissions. The implicit thinking behind the continued use of ‘verification time’ is that 
signal detection should, in the long-term, go hand-in-hand with bottom-up/top-down verification (see 
Jonas et al., 2004a: Section 2.3). 
3
 This evaluation has been carried out separately for the EU-15 Member States by Bun (2006) and 
recently, in relation to their linear targets as of 2001 and 2002, by Jonas et al. (2004b,c). 
4
 For example, Ireland is allowed a 13% increase from 1990 levels by 2008–2012, so its theoretical linear 
target for 2003 is a rise of no more than 8.5%. Its actual emissions in 2003 show an increase of 25.2% 
since 1990; hence, its DTI is 25.2 – 8.5, or 16.7 percentage points. Germany’s Kyoto target is a 21% 
reduction, so its theoretical linear target for 2003 is a decrease of 13.7%. Actual emissions in 2003 were 
18.5% lower than in 1990; hence, Germany’s DTI is (–18.5) – (–13.7), or –4.8 percentage points. 
5
 The original data underlying Table 1 (provided by Ritter; 2006) were used to reproduce the DTIs of the 
EU-25 Member States shown in Figure 2. Only the aggregated DTI for the EU-25 as a whole exhibited a 
0.1% deviation (-2.8% in Figure 2 versus -2.9% in Table 1). 
6
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Good Practice Guidelines suggest the use of a 
95% confidence interval, which is the interval, which has a 95% probability of containing the unknown 
true emission value in the absence of biases (and which is equal to approximately two standard deviations 
if the emission values are normally distributed) (Penman et al., 2000: p. 6.6). 
7
 Austria has, as the only EU-25 Member State, carried out Full Carbon Accounting (FCA) for 1990. 
Jonas and Nilsson (2001: Table 14) constructed a full carbon account, which serves as a basis for 
extracting a partial carbon account that is extended by CH4 and N2O and that is in line with the IPCC 
Guidelines (IPCC, 1997a,b,c). The respective relative uncertainties (more exactly: the median values of 
the respective relative uncertainty classes) are 2.5% for CO2; 30% for CH4; >40% for N2O; and 7.5% for 
CO2 + CH4 + N2O. 
8
 Here, KPδ  specifies the normalized emission changes, to which the Member States committed 
themselves under the EU burden sharing and which are different from those under the Kyoto Protocol. 
However, KPδ  is continued to be used to avoid additional indexing. 
9
 The base year selected is 1990 because it is determined by the ‘CO2-CH4-N2O system of gases’ (see 
Jonas et al., 2004a: Section 3). 
10
 The exact values are derived by demanding that GapU  (as given by equation (10) for DE and the UK 
and equation (14) for FR and SE) equals a Member State’s DTI (multiplied with ( )20 /13− ) and 
resolving the resulting equation for the relative uncertainty ρ . 
11
 The exact values are derived by demanding that a Member State’s DTI (multiplied with ( )20 /13− ) is 
reproduced by using equation (6) for DE and the UK; (9) for HU, SK and CZ; (13) for FR; and (17) for 
SE, respectively. 
